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THE CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE OF PROFESSION 
1 Professioa' is usually defined as man's working activity engag-
ing the whole human person in a well-defined role in society. Ac-
cording to J.M. Aubert, professor in the theological faculty at the 
University of Strasbourg, the generic element, common to all the 
professions, is the •global activity to which the person consecrates 
himself and dedicates his existence, an activity which he views as 
a call to him, a vocation 1 • 1 The term 'vocation' is bound to strike a 
familiar note in the mind and heart of persons who call themse Ives 
1Christian' and honestly strive to live up to all that that name im-
plies. le cannot fail to recall to them the serious biblical exhorta-
tion, conveyed to Christians through the words of the Apostle Paul, 
to consider well and reflect deeply upon their profession, in order 
co discern and commit themselves faithfully to the activity by which 
they are called to achieve their fulfilment as men and as Christ-
ians through the service of God and their fellow-men. Such a thought-
process, engaged in with the seriousness it deserves, inevitably 
leads to and tenninates in the source of the individual Chrisdan 's 
profession or vocation, as defined above, namely, the mystery of 
God the Father and his love, as revealed and communicated to men 
in and by the person of his Incarnate Word, Jesus Christ, who being 
himself 'the image of the invisible God' and the perfect man, fully 
reveals man to man himse If and makes his supreme calling clear. 2 
For very definite reasons this theological truth and mystical rea-
lity is frequently invoked to or evoked by Christian members of the 
medical profession. Christ Jesus is presented as 'the di vine heal-
er'; the Gospels record many instances of physical ills miraailous-
ly cured by Christ; he himself compared his mission to that of a 
physician who ministers to the needs of the sick. F~nkly, I do not 
1 Jean-Marie Aubert: 'Profess ion as Function in Society', in Concilium, 
vol. 5 n. 5 (May 1969), p. 5. 
2 Cf. The Documents of Vatican Council II: Constitution on 'The Church 
in the World Today', n. 22. 
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see why the same theological truth and mystical reality should not 
be as relevant and meaningful" to Christians dedicated to the legal 
profession. Not less than a divine healer, Jesus Christ is the di· 
vine defender of Truth and Justice; the Gospels register numerous 
examples of legal interpretations masterly pronounced by Christ; 
he himself implied his mission of advocate (helper and defender), 
when he promised that after the completion of his mission on earth, 
his heavenly Father would send another Paraclete (the Greek term 
equivalent to the Latin 'advocatus'). Moreover, he was looked u~ 
on as a 'iustus iudex', as he is called in the Holy Books and yet, 
by the strangest of ironies - humanly speaking - he was the victim 
of the grossest travesty of human justice, when he was pronounced 
innocent and handed over for capital punishment in history's most 
notorious judicial trial. 
I feel justified, therefore in borrowing the following words, ad· 
dressed by Cardinal Leon Josef Suenens, Archbishop of Malines· 
Brussels and formerly professor of Theology at Louvain Universi· 
ty, to Chris cian do.ct ors, and proposing to substitute the words 
'doctor' by 'lawyer' and 'medicine' by 'law'. 
'Which is the more correct?' asked- Cardinal Suenens, cto speak 
of a Christian who is a doctor, or a doctor who is a Christian? At 
first sight, the question seems otiose. But the fact is that it puts 
the question squarely: Is a Christian doctor first a doctor and then 
a Christian, or is he above all a Christian who practices medicine?' 
'We need not hesitate': the Cardinal replied, 'about giving the cor-
rect answer. A baptized person, doctor or not, is first of all a Christ-
ian. This position is fundamental, and with the Christian doctor 
his being baptized a Christian is his dominant and substantial qua-
lity. Christianity is the first duty of his state in life and all the 
others have to be harmonized with it. It is the spirit underlying all 
his professional obligations'. 3 
When he wrote these words, Suenens was not just inverting the 
terms of the old dichotomy: professional activity - religious faith. 
On the contrary, ne wanted to stress the point that professional ac· 
ti vity, far from constituting a sort of sealed 'profane' compartment 
separated from and unconnected with a person's religious belief 
and so called religious 'practice', should itself be integrated with 
the practice of religious belief and transformed into its most con-
vincing and credible evidence. 
The clearest and most concise explanation of this fundamental 
Christian principle was furnished by the Second Vatican Ecumeni-
3 Cardinal J. Suenens : Lov e and Control (Burns and Oates, London, 1962), 
pp. 127-1 28. 
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cal Council, which exhorted Christians, as citizens of two cities, 
namely the earthly and the heavenly, to strive to discharge their 
earthly duties conscientiously and in response to the gospel spi-
rit, reminding them that by the Faith itself they are more than ever 
obliged to measure up to these duties, professional, domestic so-
cial, each according to his proper vocation. The Council branded 
the rather widespread dichotomy between religious profession and 
professional activity in the following strong terms: 
'Nor, on the contrary, are they less wide of the mark who think 
that religion consists· in acts of worship alone and in the discharge 
of certain moral obligations, and who imagine they can plunge them-
selves into earthly affairs in such a way as to imply that these are 
altogether divorced from the religious life. The split between the 
faith which many profess and their daily lives deserves to be 
counted among the more serious errors of our age'. 4 
It is from this premise that the Christian who professes and 
practices law, whether at the Bar or at the Bench, should begin, in 
earnest and sincere respons_e to the God-given admonition, to con-
sider weU and reflect deeply upon his or her professional activity 
in the light of Christ's law or, in other words, in the light of the 
Mystery of God's love for the sal vat.ion of men made known in 
Christ Jesus, to comprehend the full meaning of the slogan appear-
ing on the cover of this Law Journal, namely how faithful service 
to the law contributes to the true liberation of man. 
I shall attempt in these paragraphs to list and explain, within 
the limits possible and permitted · by the scope of this article, the 
main theological guide lines along which Christian legal men, whe-
ther lawyers or judges, desirous to ponder upon their professional 
activity in the perspective of Christ and his teaching, are called-
and expected to discharge the duties of their calling, conscientous-
ly and in response to the Gospel Spirit, in order to avoid the fairly 
common serious error of splitting their daily lives from the faith 
which they profess. 
THE CHRISTIAN LAWYER 
The lawyer's professional act1v1t1es are concerned, generally 
speaking, with either civil or criminal cases. The former normally 
include those suits or actions in which the ownership or posses-
sion of property or the · exercise of some civil right is claimed or 
contested. ·one of the first problems which may confront the law-
yer, solicited to plead a civil law-suit, is that of the so called cun-
4 The Documents. of Vatican Council II: Constitution on <The Church in 
che World Today', n. 43. 
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just action'. May he lawfully, that is with good conscience, accept 
co offer his professional service co a client who requests him to 
plead on his behalf a civil case which the lawyer knows from the 
start co be unjust? The answer, dictated by the very justice he pro.-
fesses to serve, as well as by Christian charity, which Christ in-
dicated as the hall-mark of his followers, is an unqualified 'no'. 
Theologians make it clear that the same unqualified negative ans-
wer extends also to the event in which the lawyer is aware that the 
eventual respondent, undoubtedly on the side of the right, is not in 
a position to disprove the unju.st claim and will consequently lose 
the case. Honesty demands that the lawyer, requested to introduce 
an action which, after due investigation, he detects with moral cer-
titude to be unjust, should inform his prospective client according-
ly and decline the request. The operative words in the preceding 
statement are 'with moral certitude'. This means that if it appears 
to the lawyer that the prospective client's case is only probably 
just, he may not only accede to the request but, once he has de-
cided to accept it, he can and oughc co make use of all lawful means 
in order to consolidate the claim of his client. 
A rather thorny moral problem arises if and when, what initially 
appeared to be a probably just claim and began consequently to be 
processed by the lawyer, is seen by the latter, in the course of the 
judicial process, to be undoubtedly unj use. The solution to chis 
problem put forward by the greatest· of all theologians, St. Thomas 
Aquinas, is the following: <If in the beginning the lawyer believed 
the case to be just and afterwards in the procedure it becomes evi-
dent that it is unjust, he muse not betray the case, in such wise as 
to he Ip the other side, or to reveal the secrets of bis case to the 
other patty. But he can and must a ban don the case or induce his 
client to yield or to compromise without injury to his .adversary' •5 
The second alternative proposed in Sc. Thomas' solution, namely, 
persuading the client to withdraw the claim and recede from the ac-
tion or to seek a fair compromise without, however, any prejudice 
to the certain rights of the other party, seems to be preferable, un-
less the client persists in his will to proceed with his action, now 
evidently unjust to his lawyer, in which case the latter has only 
the first alternative left, which is chat of withdrawing from the suit. 
This mode of conduct was adopted by the Association of the Bar 
of the City of New York in its <Canons of Professional Ethics' 
which, among the causes justifying an attorney or council co with-
draw from an . undertaking assumed lists the instance 'when a law-
yer discovers · that his client has no case'. 
5 Summa Teologicae, II-II, q. 71, a. 3, ad 2 um. 
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It may happen that a lawyer regardless of the preceding ethical 
and moral considerations, decid~s, for purely profitable motives, 
:iptly described by the greatest Roman poet as 'auri sacra fames et . 
scelerata sitis', decides to plead or to proceed with what he knows 
with certainty to be an unj use case, or to induce a client to intro-
:iuce or prosecute an action which he forsees will be surely unsuc-
cessful. Black sheep are found, unfortunately, among the members 
of all professions and vocations, not excluding the noblest and 
even the most sacred ones. What evaluation is to be accorded to 
these and similar modes of conduct in the light of Christ's law and 
teaching? Christian theologians are unanimous in their interpreta-
tion of Christ's teaching on justice and charity that the lawyer who 
knowingly and deliberately undertakes an unjust case shares with 
his client the moral obligation of making restitution to all who in 
consequence suffer unjustly. In like manner, the lawyer, who for 
his own personal advantage persuades his client to press on with a 
cas~ .which the lawyer knows only too well has no chance of a suc-
cessful outcome, is obliged in conscience to refund to his client 
the financial loss incurred as a result of the prosecution of his ac-
tion, if it is clear that the lawyer's persuasion was the decisive 
factor in the prosecution of the case. The same obligation binds 
equally in those instances in which the lawyer deliberately and 
needlessly protracts a case with the intention of multiplying the 
costs and enlarging his fee. Rightful cases are sometimes lost· in 
court and clients with just claims sustain financial losses as a 
result of negligence or carelessness on the part of defence coun-
sels who fail to study the legal points involved and to conduct the 
action with the attention and diligence duly expected from them. It 
should be obvious that the lawyer who is conscious of his guilt 
and of its consequence in chis respect should advert also to his 
moral responsibility of making adequate compensation to his wrong-
ed client. 
Ethicians and moral theologians do not omit to caution members 
of the legal profession to be particularly attentive and conscien-
tious in accepting and conducting suits concerning claims for da-
mages to person or to property, in view of the seemingly prevailing 
notion that no means, not even fraud and perjury, are de ero ed to be 
reprehensible in seeking to establish claims for damages from large 
corporations and companies. An honest lawyer cannot but promptly 
and decisively deny his services, if and when he is asked to press 
a claim for damages which he deems to be unfounded and unjust. 
Occasionally the question is asked whether a Catholic lawyer 
may undertake a divorce case. This question will presumably recur 
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with greater frequency in our country in the wake of the Marriage 
Act enacted in 1975. Theologians remark that, generally speaking, 
the question must be answered in the negative. However, they qua-
lify their negative reply in the following manner. If the divorce is 
sought for a marriage that is invalid before God, such as the civil 
marriage of a Catholic, the lawyer may accept the case, particular-
ly if the intention of the person seeking the divorce is to rectify 
the state of his conscience. The same qualification extends also 
to the case in which the lawyer is given sufficient assurance that 
the civil divorce is being sought from a valid marriage with the 
sole purpose of seeking protection from molestation for one of the 
marriage-partners, neither of whom intends to contract a s·econd 
marriage, provided that the acceptance of the case by the Catholic 
lawyer does not cause scandal. It should' be remarked that this 
constitutes the_ exception rather than the rule, since divorce suits 
are normally introduced as a preparatory step cowards re-marriage. 
For this reason, a fairly general consensus exists among theolo-
gians, in the sense that apart from the cases specified above,. the 
Catholic lawyer must practically always refuse to undertake a pe· 
titian for divorce even though the petitioners are non-Catholic, 
since it pertains to the teaching of the Catholic Faith that all va-
lid marriages not only Catholic or sacramental ones, are .indisso-
luble by human authority. I have described the consensus among 
theologians on this matter as 'fairly general' because some theo-
logians reason that, since what is intrinsically wrong is not pre-
cisely the declaration of divorce but the consequent re-marriage, 
there could be, in particular cases, proportionately grave reasons 
morally justifying a Catholic lawyer to accept a divorce case with 
the usual proviso that no scandal is likely. 
In our legal system, criminal trials are governed by the principle 
that the accused is presumed innocent unless and until he is proved 
with moral certainty to be guilty of the crime of which he is charg-
ed by a majority verdict pronounced before the court and founded 
on the evidence produced and examined during the trial. It follows 
that when the accused at a criminal trial pleads 'not guilty' co the 
charge brought against him, he is not deemed to be telling an un-
truth, even if he has · committed in actual fact the criminal act of 
which he is being charged because his guilt has yet to be demon-
stated, proved and established beyond positive and reasonable 
doubt, for his innocent status co be transformed into the status of 
guilty. Accordingly, the lawyer may not only with a clear con· 
science undertake the defence of a person accused of a crime which 
the lawyer knows that person has committed, but he may also and 
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ought to utilize all objectively honest means to avert from his 
client, the defendant, the verdict of guilty. Means which are known 
to be dishonest are unjust and, consequently, morally Wllawful. Ob-
jectively just and morally lawful means of defence include refe· 
rence to and highlighting of gaps and inconsistencies in the evi-
dence produced by the prosecution, mention of or emphasis on facts 
and details that would seem co indicate chat the accused could not 
possibly have been at the p-lace of the crime at the time when the 
crime was committed, relation of deeds and instances that picture 
the defendant as a person of integrity not likely to commit the crime 
of which he stands accused. Moreover, the defence counsel is con-
sidered to be acting also within the limits of justice and lawful-
ness if he tries to invalidate the indictment on legal grounds. From 
what has been said, it appears sufficiently obvious that the lawyer 
defending a person accused of crime may neither employ perjury 
nor suborn witnesses and induce them to lie. At no moment du.ring 
the trial is the lawyer justified in violating truth. This does not 
mean, however, that, provided he restricts his words and actions to 
facts that are objectively true he may not present those facts in 
such a manner as to raise doubts in the minds of the jurors, which 
may induce them to give a negative verdict. 
The question is sometimes asked: What should the lawyer do if 
one or more witnesses for the defence, without his knowledge or 
connivance, commits perjury on the witness stand by giving false 
testimony in favour of the accused? Is the lawyer obliged to de-
nounce the perjury? May he in any way justly and lawfully take ad-
vantage of the falsely sworn statements in his de fence plea? To 
these questions theologians are agreed in replying that, since he 
~·as in no way responsible for the false testimony, the lawyer has 
no obligation to denounce the perjury. They admit, however, that 
lawyer may find himself in a rather embarassiog situation when the 
time comes for the summing up of the evidence, especially if the 
false statement is considered of a decisive nature. le is suggested 
that, while he may not propose the perjured testimony as something 
which he himself regards as true, the lawyer will oot be violating 
the truth if he merely refers to the fact that such a statement was 
made and requests the jury to consider whether and how that state-
ment could be reconciled v.·ith the charge moved against the accus-
ed. 
In conclusion of this section it hardly needs to be said that the 
lawyer is bound to observe the strictest type of secrecy, namely 
professional secrecy, regarding know ledge aod information encrust-
ed by or acquired from his client in the discharge of his profes-
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sional duties. Whether .the obligation of professional secrecy in 
this field is so absolute as to admit of no limits whatsoever in ex· 
cepcional circumstances seems to be a moot point, which I have 
neither the time nor the space sufficient to discuss in detail here. 
Just to illustrate my statement, I refer to the Canons of Profession-
al Ethics adopted by the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York: 'The announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not 
included within the confidence which he (the lawyer) is bound to 
respect. He may properly make such disclosures as may be neces-
sary to prevent the act or protect those against whom it is threa-
tened'. 
With respect to the lawyer' s fees, justice requires that they be 
reasonable. This means that the fee charged for professional ser-
vice should conform to the standards adopted by men of integrity 
in the profession. It should go without saying that a client's mere 
ability to pay does not justify an excessive charge. Christian cha-
rity demands that the lawyer should not refuse his professional 
help at a reduced charge or eve·n gratuitously to persons in need, 
to the extent that his personal circumstances permit. In this case, 
especially if the lawyer is assigned by the Court to defend an. in-
digent person, the quality and standard of his service should not 
be different from or inferior to those employed on behalf of a pay-
ing client. In this way the Christian lawyer will be practically 
harmonizing his professional activity with his Christian profession 
or vocatton. 
THE CHRISTIAN JUDGE 
The judicial doctrine derived from classical sources fails to 
give an exact definition of the Judge, but it limits itself to the 
description of his office or function. Examining the function of the 
judge in our time, the eminent Dutch Catholic jurist, Willem Ariens, 
who until a few years ago held the office of President of the Court 
of Appeal at Bois-le Due in the Netherlands, prefaced his study 
with the following remark: 
'Anyone embarking upon the examination of the demands that 
contemporary society places on the law is bound to proceed on the 
premise that the workings of the judiciary must continue to provide 
what has been traditionally expected from it; ensuring, with com-
plete impartiality and with a conscientious application of the exist-
ing legal guidelines, that justice is done. These legal guidelines 
need to be embodied in laws, laws which will have to be applied 
according to objectives which can be deduced from the drafting of 
their provisions and the history of their origins. Where this gives 
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rise to injustice, this must be blamed on the legislator, since lt 1s 
not in the power of the court to give a ruling which, however un-
just, conflicts with the law'. 6 
Certain it is that this function of the judge to apply the law to 
the facts at issue within the framework of the positive norms es-
tablished by the legislative Authority is one of tremendous respon-
sibility, when it is considered that on the judgements given by 
legal men sitting on the Bench depend the property, the liberty and 
sometimes even the lives of their fellow-citizens. It postulates in 
the holders of this exalted office a high degree of w ~sdom, pru-
dence and integrity. History and experience provide ample proof 
that the welfare of the citize~s may remain safeguarded in no 
small measure by a capable and righteous judiciary, even when in-
competence and corruption may have infiltrated the legislative and 
executive bodies of a country. The admonition· of Ben Sirach: 
'Seek not to be made a judge, unless you have strengt_h enough to 
remove iniquities', is as valid and timely today as when it was 
first written by the inspired sage of ancient Israel in the second 
century before Christ. Indeed, only those legal man should dare as-
pire to a judge's cap who are conscious of being gifted with the 
intellectual and moral qualifications demanded by this high office. 
In the face of the marked tendency of contemporary so-called 
«permissive' society to disregard or reject objective standards of 
morality, it is of fundamental importance that Christians invested 
with the judicial function should be steadfastly mindful of the un-
changeable principles of divine law relative to their official con-
duct. Once the basic obligation of a judge is to pronounce a deci-
sion or a sentence conformable to the facts presented and proved 
in testimony, he is expected to be as impartial and objective in his 
assessment of the facts as is humanly possible. In this respect 
the Canons of Judicial Ethics followed by the American Bar Asso-
ciation lay down that the judge 'should not suffer his conduct to 
justify the impression that any person can improperly influence 
him or unduly enjoy his favour, or that he is affected by the kin-
ship, rank, position or ~nfluence of any party or other person. He 
should not be swayed by partisan demands, public clamour or con-
siderations of personal popularity or notoriety, nor be apprehen-
sive of unjust criticism. 
It is well known that in trials by jury, the facts of the case and 
the credibility of the witnesses are expected to be weighed and 
decided by the jurors and that the official duty of the judge is con-
6 Willem Ariens: cThe Function of the Judge in our Time', in Concilium, 
vol. 5, n. 5 (May 1969) p. 49. 
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fined to decide points of law. It cannot be denied, however, that 
the attitude manifested by the judge throughout the judicial pro-
ceedings, and particularly his address to the jury, frequently exert 
a strong influence on the formation of their verdict. Theologians· 
point out that the sentence, which is the judge's essential respon-
sibility in the performance of his professional activity, must ne-
. cessarily proceed within the framework of the law, he must in his 
eager search after the truth endeavour to form a moral conscience 
through the study of the judicial acts and documents and formulate 
his decision accordingly. 7 
In the light of these principles, it may prove helpful to consider 
and discuss briefly the more c..ommon conscience problems which 
confront judges in the performance of their duty, as was done in the 
previous section with respect to the lawyer's exercise of his pro-
fessional activity. One of the first questions put forward concerns 
the moral obligation of the judge in the event in which he is con· 
fronted by the jury with the verdict 'not guilty', when from some 
extra-judicial source or even from personal knowledge he is moral· 
ly certain that the accused actually committed the crime with which 
he has been charged, and conversely, when in the face of a ver· 
diet 'guilty', the judge knows from similar sources that the defen· 
dant is innocent. It is the unanimous teaching of theologians that 
in the former case, the judge is morally obliged to decide -in favour 
of acquittal, if the evidence alleged in the trial is not sufficient to 
establish certain proof of guilt. The latter case is solved by the o-
logians in the sense that the judge confronted by an innocent de-
fendant who appears convicted by the available evidence, must do 
all in his power to arrive at the truth; failing which, if he. remains 
firmly convinced of the innocence of the accused, he should give 
him the minimum penalty, once it is not in his power to acquit him. 
Another conscience problem not purely hypothetical, is the follow· 
ing: What should a conscientious judge do, if subsequent events 
prove that in pronouncing sentence he erred? The first considera-
tion to be remembered here is that infallibility is not a human pre· 
rogative, not even on the. Bench of Justice. Consequently, if the 
Judge is conscious of having conscientiously fulfilled his solemn 
obligation of studying the case carefully and has conducted it with 
his best ability and diligence, he may rest assured that he h'as 
done no formal or culpable wrong. If, on the contrary, he is aware 
that his .erroneous judgement is attributable to negligence on his 
part in studying the case and devoting to it the necessary time and 
7 Cf. Roberti-Palazzini: Dictionary of .'rforal Theology (Burns and Oates, 
London, 1962) under the voice JUDGE, p. 668. 
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~Hort, or to his culpable ignorance he becomes morally bound, as 
n the case of the lawyer consciously undertaking and prosecuting 
injust lawsuits, to make restitution to chose who have suffered 
naterial loss as a result of his negligence or incompetence. Of 
:ourse, the obligation_ of making restitution is still more evident 
>r stringent, if the material loss is caused not through erroneous 
udgement but through wilful injustice, motivated by considerations 
>f personal gain. In this connection, theologians in vesr:igate the 
iuestion of 'gifts' offered to or accepted by judges. I prefer to use 
he word 'gifts' in place of the more despicable term 'bribe', which, 
ts is well known, may be of various kinds. le should be quite clear 
.hat if, in consideration of a gift, a judge pronounces judgement in 
favour of the party that has justice on his side, he should never· 
:heless, return the gift, because he has sold a decision which he 
was already bound to render by virtue of his official position. If 
:he gift induces him to favour the side which is not in the right, he 
is morally obliged not only to gi v.e back the gift but also, unless 
:his is done by the party he has unjustly favoured, to make amends 
co the extent of the whole loss incurred by the victim of his injus· 
tice. Very wisely it is stated in the Canons of Judicial Ethics of 
the American Bar Association that the judge 'should not accept 
any presents or favours from litigants or from lawyers practising 
before him or from others whose interests are likely to be submit-
ted to him for judgement'. -
The last but by no means the least grave problem facing the 
Christian judge is that of the application of an unj use law. Theo-
logians are agreed that in the face of an unjust law, a judge may 
not sentence the defendant to commit an immoral act or inflict on 
him a severe penalty, even if this entails the loss of his pose or 
other grave consequences. This constitutes one of those grave, 
painful, at times heroic decisions, foretold by Christ the Lord in 
the Go~pel, which test from its very depth the faith of chose who 
profess themselves Christians. If, however, the principal act which 
is prescribed or prohibited by the unjust law is not in itself evil, 
the judge may apply the law which is considered to be unjust. As 
explai~ed by Judge Ariens, the unjust law should be blamed on the 
legislator and not on the judge. This does not mean: ho·wever, that 
the judge is absolved of all personal responsibility in its applica-
tion. 
It is envisaged that certain dispositions of the Marriage Act, 
1975, enacted recently in our country will present our judges with 
a oumber of delicate conscience problems touching matters of 
Christian religious belief and convictions. May, for example, a 
Christian judge pronounce null a consummated valid religious and 
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sacra~ental marriage, which by di vine and Church law constitutes 
a divinely-joined bond, indissoluble by any human power, on the 
grounds of sterility in one of the partners, especially if the condi-
tion of sterility was unknown to both partners? Or for that matter, 
may the Catholic judge even take cognizance of nullity cases in 
marriages celebrated by Catholics in the religious form, when it is 
the teaching of the Catholic Faith that jurisdiction on the matri-
monial causes of Catholics, affecting the marriage itself and not 
merely its civil effects, belongs ex:c lusively to ecclesiastical judg-
es, as declared in the Council of Trent? 
It is certain that, whatever his Christian conscience may dic-
tate to the individual judge, his declaration in these and similar 
cases cannot, be intended by him to mean more than a mere offi-
cial declaration - and it may be necessary for him to make this 
explicit and clear - that the State regards the civil ~ffects of that 
particular marriage as no longer existing. 
CONCLUSION 
I would like to close these considerations on the same note on 
which I opened them and by a reference to the same source, the 
teaching of Vatican Council II. 
'Therefore, let there be no false opposition between profession-
al and social activities on the one part, and religious life on the 
other. The Christian who neglects his temporal duties neglects 
his duties towards his neighbour and even God, and jeopardizes 
his eternal salvation ••. In the exercise of all their earthly activi-
ties, they (Christians) can thereby gather their humane, domestic 
professional, social and technical enterprises into one vital syn-
thesis with religious values, under whose supreme direction all 
things are harmonized unto God's glory'. 8 
Need I add that I have said nothing new or uncommon in these 
papers? 9 I imagine that those readers who have persevered right 
up to this concluding paragraph may be telling themselves: 1We 
know these things; we have known them ever since'. In this case, 
it would not be out of place to remind them of Christ's re mark to a 
prospective follower, who made the same comment: 1 Very well, 
then; do chem, and you will be saved'. 
8 The Documents of Vatican Council II: Constitution on 1The Church in 
the World Today', n. 43. 
9 lam chiefly indebted for this contribution to the studies on this subject by 
the late Professor Francis J. Connell, former Dean of the School of Theo-
logy of the Catholic University of America in his work en citied: ,\1orals in 
Politics and Professions (The Newman Press, Westminster Maryland, 
1961). 
69 
